in accumulation, the lifetime propensity to save out of capital receipts being much higher than the one out of permanent income. Moreover, the joint contribution to But this may simply reflect the fact that the theory was originally designed to deal with average or aggregate behaviour: another variant of the LCH is indeed needed to study the distribution of personal wealth, its intra-cell dispersion and its relation to permanent income. Section 2 of the paper proposes such a modified approach of the theory which leans heavily on its recent developments. While remaining largely faithful to the original view expressed by MODIGLIANI and BRUMBERG [1954] (referred to in the following as MB), the "second generation" life cycle 
Theoretical

Framework
We shall first recall the basic principles and equations of the LCH which assumes that the rational, forward looking consumer accumulates assets for consumption smoothing over his lifetime, especially after retirement: for a standard non property income profile, wealth exhibits the famous hump shaped pattern with respect to age. We shall then try to summarize the contribution of 'second generation' models which envisage more realistic environments, allowing notably for uncertainty and capital market imperfec tions.
Besides age and lifetime resources, these models point out to a number of individual factors of wealth dispersion which are summed up in Table 1. Among them, those which can engender significant non proportionality between wealth and permanent income at a given age are reported in Second, the introduction of a bequest motive leads to a division of net worth into "life cycle wealth", S, and "transmission wealth", K, which are assumed to follow separable and heterogenous processes of accumulation. One may also argue that this division is not exhaustive since it does not encompass some important wealth holding motives. Some assets may be held mainly for economic power or for social prestige and hence provide direct utility, whether they are earmarked for bequest or not: for an operational decomposition of wealth, such assets must indeed be included in K-wealth. In empirical work a crude division will finally be made between S-assets, assimilated to consumption wealth and including life annuities and pensions, liquid saving, durable goods and residential housing and K-wealth, assimilated to capital investment and comprising stocks and shares, investment in real estate, business equities...
French estimates of wealth elasticities of assets do largely confirm predictions (MASSON and ARRONDEL [1987], chapter 4).
They are around .7 for liquid saving, around .9 for owner-occupied housing or housing savings arrangements, generally above 1.2 for K assets; some S-assets, such as secondary residence and some bonds, appear however as "luxury" goods. 5. The instantaneous budget constraint (4) continues to hold whenever the borrowing rate equals the rate of return r; other equations must be considered only as approximations, sometimes very rough approximations indeed. 
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6. Even the basic property (III) of a forward looking and autonomous consumption behaviour may not anymore hold. For instance, certain investment decisions concerning durables or dwellings may be partly irreversible owing to adjustment costs. Also, MODIGLIANI [1986] assumes that the share of lifetime resources earmarked for bequest depends on the household's relative position in the distribution of resources of its age cohort, which makes indirectly consumption a function of this position. 7. A third factor is here largely neglected, namely the incidence of income related choices on the accumulation process. The retirement decision process (see DH) and the participation choice of wives may however significantly influence the amount of wealth. More gen erally, the quantitative importance of income formation on wealth accumulation is a crucial issue for the validity of the LCH: in the limit case where he had total command over his resources, the consumer could directly adapt his income profile to the desired consumption pattern, without any need for saving. 8. Nothing is said about the effects of demographic factors, such as marital status or family size. Admittedly, no satisfactory analysis of the effect of the number of children on wealth accumulation is yet available. This effect is indeed not easy to assess: rearing costs can be partially financed by family allowances; on the other hand, the positive effect on planned bequest can be compensated by the negative effect on precautionary bequest if the family serves as a proxy to an annuity market (KOTLIKOFF and SPIVAK [1981] The wealth-permanent income relation is considered here cross-section ally, while controlling for age but not for other individual, often unobserva ble differences: the benchmark is therefore rather "average proportionality", holding only age constant, than strict proportionality, ceteris paribus. behaviour and violate therefore the strict proportionality relation, "every thing being equal"; the other factors result only from consumers' heterogen eities besides age and permanent income.
Factors of non homothetic behaviour, which generate superproportionality (a rising ratio A/YP with YP) include notably planned bequest (factor 1). Capital market non homogeneities, such as the existence of tax gimmicks offered by certain assets, or a rising rate of return with the amount invested, make also the rich richer. A similar conclusion is to be generally expected with imperfect information and with capital market constraints9 (factor 2). Also, a more uncertain income leads to a higher accumulation among self-employed through precautionary savings, risk aversion being usually strong and superior to one (factor 3).
The most important factor of superproportionality among those created by consumers heterogeneities is likely to be social mortality differentials (factor 4), wealthy people expecting a longer retirement period. Factors 5 and 6 (see notes of (1) age effects must be controlled for differences in permanent incomes as it is the case with the wealth equation ( 
Empirical studies (BGW, DH, KDM, Hubbard) tend to confirm LCH predictions: however, the degree of substitution for SSW is limited on average (below half)
. Such micro studies of the relation between tradi tional wealth and (public) pensions are unfortunately not available in France. Table 6 ) that this ratio shows great dispersion at given age and occupational group and that receptions are more evenly distributed over the life cycle of the beneficiary in younger cohorts. 
The Effect of Capital Receipts
An Alternative
Model of Wealth Accumulation?
To assess the role of age and permanent income in wealth inequality we have then to study the individual factors that may generate non proportion ality and determine their likely outcome. These factors are of two types: LCH x-factors (Table 2 ) which lead on balance to superproportionality and z-factors which are a subset of the Z-factors alien to the LCH.
To investigate the nature of the main potential z-factors, the best approach is to oppose to the LCH a simple alternative model of wealth distribution, or for a part of wealth (S-assets).
It is clear that the SA model points out a series of z-factors that should on the average lead to strong superproportionality.
The test relative to the permanent income effect on wealth does not therefore give a way to discriminate between the LCH and the SA models; but it can refute both models if a strong subproportionality is empirically found.
A battery of tests should be proposed in this spirit: find ways to discrimi nate between the LCH and SA models and also try to assess their relevance to accumulation behaviour. The worst case is when both models are refuted (see Table 4 Table 3 ).
The main advantages of this survey come from its large size and the detailed information available on households' characteristics which enabled Table 6 for the linear and logarithmic models). If French values are comparable, this means indeed a higher elasticity of bequest with respect to inheritance than with respect to human resources. 22. Note however that the number of children for instance has a higher additional contribution to wealth inequality when combined with age; the limited size of the sample does not allow us however to go far enough in this "stepwise" like decomposition of contributions to wealth inequality. Notes: see Table 7 . Source: Panel CREP 1980. Table 9 shows that contributions among inheritors and non inheritors are similar; moreover, the contributions to S-wealth inequality are higher among inheritors (for however a comparatively lower degree of wealth inequality).
These results are again not too favourable to the LCH.
Finally the high contribution of the inheritance dummy h to A-wealth inequality (21. 8%) and the fact that the conditional contributions of h, p (h/a = t) at age t, remain quite important at old age (when the "timing" effect of inheritance is small) are supplementary evidence of a strong size effect of inheritance in favour of the SA model.
These conclusions
for France are on the whole more favourable to the LCH than the ones derived for Canada.
It should be nevertheless emphas ized that the French results are not fully reliable, since current income is used instead of permanent income. An important issue concerns in particu lar the level of permanent income among low-wealth holders near retirement (see Table 4 
254
. References
